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TheMatrix message-oriented middleware1 is gaining momentum
as a basis for a decentralized, secure messaging system as shown,
for example, by its deployment within the French government and
by the Mozilla foundation. Thus, understanding the corresponding
access control approach is important. This paper provides an ab-
straction and an analysis of the access control approach followed by
Matrix. We show that Matrix can be seen as a form of Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT) based on Transaction-based Directed
Acyclic Graphs (TDAGs). TDAGs connect individual transactions
to form a DAG, instead of collecting transactions in blocks as in
blockchains. These TDAGs only provide causal order, eventual
consistency, and no finality. However, unlike conventional DLTs,
Matrix does not aim for a strict system-wide consensus. Thus, there
is also no guarantee for a strict consensus on access rights. By de-
composition of the Matrix approach, we show that a sound decen-
tralized access control can be implemented for TDAGs in general,
and for Matrix in particular, despite those weak guarantees. In ad-
dition, we discovered security issues in popular implementations
and emphasize the need for a formal verification of the employed
conflict resolution mechanism.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The starting point of our analysis is a specification of communica-
tion protocols and behavior of a decentralized publish-subscribe
middleware with integrated history and state tracking, calledMa-
trix.1 Currently,Matrix represents the basis for a popular decentral-
izedmessaging tool with a higher ambition to interconnect arbitrary
1
See https://matrix.org/. Please note that we use the term “middleware”, commonly
used in distributed systems, now for decentralized systems.
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platforms for near real-time communication. The use of Matrix by
the French government [7] and the Mozilla foundation [10], among
others, and the discussion of its use in organizations like the Federal
Defence Forces of Germany [8] demonstrates its relevance. Since
theMatrix approach is evidently used, or intended to be used, in
deployments with strict security requirements, there is a natural
interest in understanding and assessing the underlying access con-
trol approach. However, the Matrix approach is an unconventional
one, resembling elements of distributed ledger technologies and
blockchains. Thus, an analysis of the access control system requires
an analysis of the decentralized approach itself. In this paper, we
address the following three questions:
(1) What type of decentralized system is given by Matrix?
(2) Are the foundations of such a system sufficient to provide a
valid access control approach?
(3) What access-control-related aspects need to be addressed
before a ‘mission-critical’ deployment can be recommended?
In this paper, these aspects are addressed by ‘decomposing’ the
Matrix approach. The first question will be answered by showing
that theMatrix approach to decentralization can be seen as a variant
of a distributed ledger, using a Transaction-based Directed Acyclic
Graph (TDAG) without finality as transaction store. This form of
abstraction does not only generalize results, but is essential for
understanding the system. While the notion of a Transaction-based
Directed Acyclic Graph without finality is clarified in the following,
it basically translates into rather weak guarantees upon which an
access control system is built. Surprisingly, as answer to the second
question, the decomposition shows that those weak guarantees
seem to be indeed sufficient to build a sound access control system.
However, in answering question three, we show that some further
actions are required.
Decentralized trust management has been a topic of research
for quite some time, see e.g. [2]. Decentralized access control for
publish-subscribe systems has been proposed, e.g., in [17]. However,
previous work has either not analyzed access control approaches
implemented on top of TDAGs or similar distributed ledgers, or
finality is assumed, like in the IOTA Tangle [18]. Our contribution
is the analysis of a TDAG-based access control approach without
finality. In this context, we solely focus on policy specification,
policy information, and policy enforcement.
Distributed ledger technologies implement distributed, highly-
available, append-only databases. In their earliest form, transactions
to the database are collected into blocks and linked together to form
a linear chain, the so-called blockchain concept. In contrast, the
Transaction-based Directed Acyclic Graph concept links transac-
tions together to form a Directed Acyclic Graph instead of a linear
chain, which reduces the inherent ordering from a total to a partial
order [15]. Distributed ledger technologies can be characterized
by their trade-off decision between decentralization, consistency,
and scalability, also known as the DCS triangle
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[23]. Similar to
the CAP theorem [4, 3], the DCS triangle’s yet to be proven conjec-
ture is that only two out of three properties can be fully achieved
simultaneously, and that there is a gradual trade-off between those
properties. The system under consideration, Matrix, trades consen-
sus on a total ordering of conflicting transactions and on which
transactions can be considered final (i.e. finality), for a high degree
of decentralization and scalability. Without the need to solve a
consensus problem, there is also no need for, e.g., proof of work or
similar mechanisms as used in the Bitcoin blockchain. However, as
a consequence there is no system-wide consensus on access control.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we classify what
type of decentralized system the Matrix middleware is. Further-
more, we explain and classify the fundamental data structure used
byMatrix as a TDAG. We elaborate on the challenges associated
with access control based on the weak guarantees given by TDAGs
as used byMatrix. We also define the requirements that a decen-
tralized access control system based on partial order has to fulfill
to be considered secure. Fundamental related work is also provided
in Section 2, however, as this paper touches various fields (Matrix
specification, access control models, publish-subscribe systems, dis-
tributed/decentralized system) we also give references to related
work in all of the following sections. In Section 3 we analyze how
Matrix deals with partial order and non-finality. In Subsection 3.1, a
conceptual model for access control for the given interface and guar-
antees is described based on Lattice-based Access Control (LBAC)
and Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC). As concurrency can
give rise to conflicts in causal relationships, we analyze in Subsec-
tion 3.2 a conflict resolution mechanism required to provide an
attribute store for the access control system. While the previous
sections only assumed an implementation of the interface and guar-
antees, we describe in Subsection 4.1 architecture and mechanisms
of a truly decentralized system based on TDAGs. We assess the
decentralized access control system implementation proposed by
Matrix for its security in Subsection 4.2, describe several security
issues and present insights gained from the assessment. Finally, we
conclude in Section 5 that decentralized, secure implementations of
the analyzed class of access control systems seems possible with the
given guarantees, but emphasize the need for formal verification
of the conflict resolution mechanism and the need to understand
the ‘characteristics’ of an access control approach based on TDAGs
without finality.
2 CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW &
DECOMPOSITION
2.1 System Overview and Terminology
Matrix is a specification3 for a decentralized publish-subscribe mid-
dleware with integrated history and state tracking. Its most com-
monly used application is a messaging system: Messaging is based
on “rooms”, which are conversation groups on a theme, consisting
of an arbitrary number of users that can join, read, participate in
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To the best of our knowledge, the idea was first found in
https://blog.bigchaindb.com/the-dcs-triangle-5ce0e9e0f1dc
and leave the conversation. Rooms have a history of current and
past communication messages as well as a state that is represented
by a set of currently valid attributes of the room. A user’s participa-
tion in a room is modeled in form of a membership relation, which
is augmented by attributes as well. Attributes are not only used as
“cosmetic” metadata on rooms and memberships, like their name
and avatar, but also for moderation and access control in general.
Attributes can represent whether a room is a public channel free for
anyone to join or a private, invite-only group. Similarly, attributes
can specify whether anybody is free to speak in a room or only a
subset of users is allowed to send messages. For access control, it
is particularly important to note that administrative permissions,
i.e. permissions to change policy attributes, are represented as at-
tributes as well.
One user can have multiple devices associated with their ac-
count, which are not required to be online all the time in order
to receive messages. Instead, users associate themselves with a
so-called “homeserver”, a server which acts as a representative for
them in theMatrix network, and is in charge of relaying user ac-
tions from and to the homeservers of other users. Users either use
a homeserver provided by a third party or operate their own.
For each room, homeservers of joined users form a federation in
which they exchange new messages and attribute changes. Each
room is strictly independent of other rooms, i.e. there is no protocol-
level interaction between rooms. For access control decisions, only
the attributes of the concerned room and memberships are relevant.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume the presence of a single
room and a single federation only. However, all considerations can
be generalized to multiple rooms existing in parallel.
We will use the terminology of publish-subscribe and access
control systems instead of Matrix terminology as follows. We con-
sider the union of all devices of a user to be a subject of the access
control system, which subscribe to and publish to topics instead
of sending to and receiving from rooms. While being subscribed
to a topic implicitly grants receive permissions, a subject is not
required to exercise them, although a subscription is required for
publishing to a topic. Subjects publish messages to a topic’s history
or attribute changes on the topic or a topic’s memberships. Mes-
sages and attribute changes always have a type, which specifies the
semantics of the content.Matrix therefore is a topic-based, typed
publish-subscribe system.
We can also compare the Matrix middleware to distributed
ledgers. More specifically, each topic in Matrix is considered an in-
dependent distributed ledger. According to Zhang et al., distributed
ledgers can be split up into three major components:
• The append-only data structure that stores transactions
• The peer-to-peer-network that distributes transactions
• The consensus mechanism that provides conflict resolution
to conflicting transactions
In this paper, we do not address aspects of the peer-to-peer network
as a distribution mechanism (see, e.g., [11] for a monitoring study
of theMatrix network). In contrast, this paper addresses the data
structure and analyzes the “consensus mechanism” component with





















Figure 1: Layer model for the Matrix middleware. Rounded, blue-
filled boxes are layers, rectangles are interfaces provided by the
lower layer and used by the upper layer. The layers are abstracted
from decentralization aspects, i.e. reduced to a single instance.
Figure 1 shows the inner working of the Matrix middleware:
At its core lies the per-topic Transaction Store, which only allows
appending new and querying past transactions. To the application
layer, however, Matrix provides a publish-subscribe interface with
history access. This is achieved by a translation between the inter-
nal and external interface, which maps the publication of a message
to appending a message transaction, and the publication of an at-
tribute change to appending an attribute transaction. The internal
transaction-based interface is more powerful, as it allows the specifi-
cation of a causal relation of a new transaction with respect to other
transactions, which is not possible using the publish-subscribe in-
terface. Utilizing all attribute transactions in the Transaction Store,
the Conflict Resolution layer resolves conflicts between concurrent
or contradicting attribute changes. The Conflict Resolution layer
derives a consistent total ordering based on the causal ordering
of transactions, and, thus, is able to provide an interface to query
the resolved attributes. The attribute interface and the transaction
interface together enable provisioning of the publish-subscribe in-
terface with history access. Both interfaces are intercepted by the
Reference Monitor layer that is responsible for evaluation and en-
forcement of access control. The Reference Monitor depends on
the conflict-resolved attributes provided by Conflict Resolution as
sole policy information source to make an access control decision.
2.2 TDAG-based Ledgers without Finality and
their Guarantees
In this section, we classify the Transaction Store used by Matrix
as a Transaction-based Directed Acyclic Graph (TDAG) and expli-
cate the (weak) guarantees that it provides: partial (causal) order,












chatmsg: “How are you?”
chatmsg: “I’m fine.”
chatmsg: “And you?” chatmsg: “Now what?”
Figure 2: Example of a Matrix Transaction-based Directed Acyclic
Graph storing all transactions for a topic. Both message and at-
tribute transactions are stored in the same data structure.
Partial (causal) order. New local transactions can be in a causal
relationship to the past transactions currently available to the local
replica of the data structure, but not in causal relation to concur-
rent or past transactions from remote replicas not yet known to
the local replica. This potential causal relationship is known as
the “happened before” relationship as defined
4
by Lamport [16],
which leads to a partial order on all transaction, the so-called causal
order. New transaction only need to reference existing transactions
without descendants due to transitivity: If transaction 𝑥 happened
before 𝑦 and 𝑦 happened before 𝑧, then 𝑥 happened before 𝑧.
In Matrix, the causal order is established by the homeservers:
When a user creates a new transaction and forwards it to their
homeserver, the homeserver will append it to all local transactions
that are not yet in a “happened before” relation with newer transac-
tions, which keeps the number of references minimal. Using the fact
that every partial order can be presented as a directed acyclic graph
(DAG), homeservers use a DAG to store all transactions and their
causal order. Such a DAG is called a TDAG (c.f. [15]). An example
of such a TDAG is given in Fig. 2.
Eventual consistency. Every homeserver with users subscribed
to a topic will try to synchronize its full TDAG with every other
subscribed server. Due to synchronization not being instantaneous,
different servers can append concurrent transactions to their TDAG
replica, which are later synchronized and result in parallel transac-
tions that cannot be compared causally. In graph terms, concurrent
4
Note that Lamport defines 𝑥 “happened before” 𝑦 as 𝑥 → 𝑦. In this paper, we
actually use the converse relation 𝑦 → 𝑥 , so that new transactions can reference old
transactions and the metadata of transactions can be kept immutable. It follows that
for 𝑦 → 𝑥 , we say 𝑥 is the parent transaction of 𝑦.
transactions are a fork in the DAG and create independent causal
chains. When synchronization is not possible for an extended pe-
riod of time, e.g., during a network partition, chains of transactions
independently grow and replicas will be in an inconsistent state
until synchronization is possible again. New transactions after the
synchronization will reference the most recent transaction from
both chains, whichwill lead to the independent chains beingmerged
again.When reading the data structure, it is up to the reader to inter-
pret the independent transactions of different chains. The TDAG as
described above, thus, provides eventual consistency, which means
that replicas can get inconsistent temporarily, but will eventually
reach a consistent state when the partition is resolved.
No finality. To be able to resynchronize after an arbitrary long
time of network partition, a design principle of Matrix is to have
no upper limit on the time required to eventually reach consis-
tency between replicas: Transactions always get accepted and are
never lost regardless of the duration of network partitions. This
means that replicas have to accept new transactions regardless of
their “happened before” relation to other transaction in the TDAG.
Consequently, no parts of the TDAG can ever be considered final.
The TDAG used by Matrix is constructed in an append-only
fashion, which especially means that the metadata of transactions
is immutable. For referencing, each transaction is assigned a unique
identifier by means of a cryptographic hash function based on its
immutable parts. This identifier is used for encoding the “happened
before” relation, and can be used to verify the integrity of a full
transaction given its hash. The fact that Matrix is based on an
append-only, fully replicated data structure for transactions, which
are linked by the “happened before” relationship using transaction
hashes to verify their integrity, suggests that Matrix can be con-
sidered a distributed ledger. However, in contrast to other popular
distributed ledger technologies,Matrix realizes a distributed ledger
without finality.
Overall, only the following weak guarantees are provided by the
Transaction Store of Matrix that is implemented as a TDAG:
• the ordering consistency error is lower-bounded to causal
order
• the staleness consistency error is lower-bounded to eventual
consistency
• no finality: no upper limit is enforced on the resynchro-
nization time for eventual consistency between independent
replicas.
In the following, we will analyze the characteristics of an access
control system built on these weak guarantees.
2.3 Course of Analysis and Requirements
We follow a two-step approach in our analysis. First, we start in
Section 3 by assuming that Transaction Store, Conflict Resolution
and Reference Monitor (c.f. Fig. 1) are provided by a central trusted
third party, but with the same guarantees as described in Subsec-
tion 2.2. This means that the Reference Monitor has to cope with a
Transaction Store that only provides a partial order on the stored
transactions and no finality. Second, in Section 4, we replace the
trusted third party with an architecturally [5] and politically de-
centralized system. The Reference Monitor, Conflict Resolution
and Transaction Store layers are distributed over multipleMatrix
servers cooperating to provide the layer, without a single party
being in control of all replicas.
In a distributed system, eventual consistency without finality
means that arbitrarily old transactions can come in at any point in
time. Thus, attackers can send artificially aged transactions. While
eventual consistency and non-finality of a partial order originate
from the distributed nature of a system, we “concentrate” them in
the first step: The Reference Monitor interface allows subjects to
append new transactions in an arbitrary “happened before” relation,
as long as the new transaction does not contradict other transac-
tions in the chosen causal relation. This way, we can concentrate
on dealing with partial order and non-finality without accounting
for the technicalities induced by decentralization of Transaction
Store, Conflict Resolution and Reference Monitor in the presence
of attackers.
In the first step, attackers are malicious subjects limited to the
interface provided by the Reference Monitor which try to abuse
their interaction permissions and the non-finality of the Trans-
action Store. Although its interface is simple and provides weak
guarantees, as detailed in Subsection 2.2, we facilitate reasoning by
modeling the Transaction Store using a trusted third party.
Using the trusted third party abstraction, we generalize the ac-
cess control system employed byMatrix to an access control model
for publish-subscribe systems with the given Transaction Store
and Conflict Resolution interface. Note that policy decision by
the Reference Monitor requires policy information obtained from
the Conflict Resolution layer. Conflict Resolution uses the partial
order on transactions provided by the Transaction Store and re-
solves conflicts by deriving a total order on concurrent transactions.
While deriving some total order from a given partial order is a well-
understood and solved task [14], the task here is to derive a secure
total order. To derive a secure total order, the conflict resolution
mechanism proposed byMatrix is inherently tied to properties of
the access control model, which is why both are described conjunc-
tively in Section 3.
To maintain security, the Reference Monitor layer has to fulfill
the following requirements:
• interrupt all accesses of subjects on Conflict Resolution and
Transaction Store
• allow an initially omnipotent topic creator subject to effec-
tively and granularly pass on or restrict regular and admin-
istrative permissions
• prevent any privilege escalation that is not directly or indi-
rectly originating from the topic creator subject
• resolve conflicts to the advantage of honest subjects
In the second step (Section 4), malicious subjects are in full
control of their replica, but not of the replica of honest subjects.
For the system to be considered secure, we require equivalence
between the decentralized system and the system using a central
trusted third party for all honest subjects, regardless of the presence
of an arbitrary number of malicious subjects whose replicas exhibit
byzantine faults.
3 DEALINGWITH PARTIAL ORDER AND
NON-FINALITY
In this section, we assume that a central trusted third party provides
the ledger, i.e. the Reference Monitor, Conflict Resolution and the
Transaction Store. The central trusted third party can easily provide
the required Transaction Store interface and guarantees, as repli-
cation and decentralization is put out of scope. We first describe
and analyze an access control model generalized from theMatrix
system in Subsection 3.1. This model is used for policies which
are evaluated and enforced by the Reference Monitor. The access
control model and Reference Monitor do not deal with partial order
and non-finality itself, but instead externalize it to the Conflict Res-
olution layer, which is used as authorization database and described
in Subsection 3.2. Resolving conflicts in itself is simple: A conflict
between two concurrent, partially ordered transactions is, in theory,
resolved by deriving any form of total order. The key point is to
derive a secure total order, which is neither trivial to define nor
to implement. We describe the Matrix approach to secure conflict
resolution, which is tied to the employed access control model.
3.1 Level- and Attribute-Based Access Control
Matrix primarily employs a reduced variant of Lattice-based Access
Control (LBAC), an access control model where security levels or
clearances are assigned to subjects and objects [19]. The security
levels are expressed as a partially ordered set. Policies define which
security level is required for an access, usually differentiating be-
tween read and write accesses to control the flow of information.
For example, subjects could be allowed write access if their security
level is equal or greater than the object’s, and read access if their
security level is equal or lower than the object’s. Another, more
commonly used approach is Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [21]:
Access permissions are assigned to roles, and roles are assigned to
users. In the Hierarchical Role-based Access Control (HRBAC) vari-
ant, a role hierarchy is defined as a partial order, where higher roles
inherit all the permissions of lower roles. With a role hierarchy, all
LBAC variants can be expressed as RBAC [20].
3.1.1 Entities and Operations. In the following, we will introduce
a conceptual model for access control on publish/subscribe interac-
tions of subjects and topics, which is depicted in Fig. 3. The relation
between subjects and topics, i.e. whether a subject is subscribed to
a topic, is explicitly modeled through a Subscription. We assume
that subjects have direct access to the Reference Monitor interface
shown in Fig. 1 and therefore can define the “happened before”
relationship at their discretion, i.e. their parent transactions in the
underlying DAG (c.f. Fig. 2). This means that the model performs
access control on two operations: appending new transactions to
the data store in a subject-defined causal relationship and querying
previously published transactions. Subjects might be dishonest and
can try to circumvent access control or elevate their privileges.
All transactions have a type, which differentiates between trans-
actions with different kinds of application-specific semantics. All
types of transactions fall in one of two
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categories, but which type
belongs to which category is up to the application. All transactions
5
For clarity, we omit thatMatrix includes a third type for redacting other transactions,


























permissions: Type → Level
. . .
Figure 4: Attributes in Level-based Access Control (LeBAC)
have a content field as main payload. The basic form of transac-
tions are message transactions which represent one-off messages
published by a subscribed sender to a specific topic. The second
transaction category are attribute transactions which set or update
attributes of Subscriptions and Topics. The attribute name is the
transaction’s type, the attribute value is the transaction’s content
and can be arbitrary, e.g. an integer, string, reference to another
transaction, list or map. Usage of the “Query Attributes” interface
of the Reference Monitor is treated equal to a query to the corre-
sponding latest attribute transaction of the specified type.
3.1.2 Level-based Access Control. In its basic form, we describe
LeBAC, a variant of Biba’s LBAC without information flow control.
As shown in Fig. 3, each subscription is assigned to a level. Levels is
a totally ordered set representing the permissions a subscriber has,
e.g. a set of clearance levels or a range of integers. Requiring a total
order on levels is a key difference to LBAC, and the total comparison
between subjects by level is used in the Matrix Conflict Resolution
layer implementation to deal with partial order and non-finality (see
Subsection 3.1). TransactionTypes is the set of all existing transac-
tion types of all categories, representing the permission to publish
a transaction of the specific type. Each level inherits all permis-
sion assignments from lower levels, creating a linear hierarchy of
permissions. As shown in Fig. 4, subscriptions are assigned to a
level through their level attribute, and permissions are mapped to
levels through the topic’s permissions attribute. Subjects create
new Topics by sending an attribute transaction of type creator
with themselves as attribute value, targeting a non-existent Topic.
The transaction is the only transaction which is valid with an empty
happened_before relation, and grants the creator universal permis-
sions until they send their first permissions attribute transaction.
Other subjects are subscribed to a topic by permissioned subjects
sending an attribute transaction of type level targeting the non-
existent subscription of unsubscribed subjects. This process results
in discretionary access control from the point of view of the topic
creator, and mandatory access control for other subscribers, as they
can not subscribe to the topic or publish any kind of transaction to
the topic at their discretion. However, the creator can transfer per-
missions, including the permission to change levels and permission
assignments. While this effectively creates new subscribers with
discretionary access rights, every transfer of permissions can be
traced back to the initial creator having had all permissions. Due to
administrative permissions being handled with the same primitives
as regular permissions, LeBAC is its own administrative model.
For a query operation, the policy evaluation by the Reference
Monitor is simple: First, it checks whether the queried topic and
transaction exist. If they exist, it checks whether the querying
subject has a valid Subscription to the topic at the time of the queried
transaction or is the topic creator. To check this, the Reference
Monitor uses the Conflict Resolution layer, asking for the value of
the level attribute of the Subscription and the creator attribute
of the topic. The point in time is given by passing the transaction
to query, for which the Conflict Resolution layer computes the
attribute state, i.e. the Subscription’s level and the topic’s creator,
and returns it to the Reference Monitor. If the subject has been
assigned a level, the subject is considered to be subscribed to the
topic and the access is seen as valid.
For append operations, the policy to evaluate is more elaborate:
Like for the query operation, it begins with checking whether the
queried topic exists, and whether the subject has subscribed to the
given topic. All transactions require a “happened before” relation
to at least one existing previous transaction in an existing topic,
transactions of type creator are required to be sent to non-existing
topics and have an empty “happened before” relation. Using the
type of the transaction to append, the permissions of the subject
are checked. For this, the Conflict Resolution layer is queried for the
permission attribute of the topic. If there is none, i.e. there has not
yet been a permission assignment, the Reference Monitor checks
the creator attribute of the topic to see whether the subject is the
topic creator and therefore is allowed all permissions until first
permission assignment. Permission assignments are a map from
transaction types to required levels. The reference monitor checks
whether the required level is less than or equal to the subject’s level.
To get the topic’s permission assignment and the subject’s level, the
Conflict Resolution layer is queried for the required attributes, using
the list of all “happened before” relations from the transaction, i.e.
the causally independent chains to append the transaction to. The
response contains the attribute values after combining the state of
all causally independent chains. For this, conflicts between chains
are resolved to end up with a single attribute value considered
to be the current state for the new transaction to append. If the
transaction to append is an attribute transaction which targets
another subject than the publisher, the Reference Monitor enforces
that the publisher has a greater level than the target. Lastly, there
is a set of policies that control and restrict the flow of permissions,
i.e. attribute transactions relevant for access control. First, a subject
that is allowed to set the level attribute cannot assign subjects
to a greater level than its own level. This means that a subject
cannot elevate its own rights, and cannot grant other subjects more
rights than it possesses itself. Second, the permission assignment
for a given transaction type cannot be elevated to a higher level
than the subject’s own level. This means that a subject cannot
remove permissions from other subjects on the same level. However,
permissions can be made unreachable if a single subject which has
the greatest level sets the required level for a given type to its
current level, and then demotes itself to a lower level.
LeBAC’s policy decision mainly applies permissions to publish-
ing, not to receiving transactions, i.e. it only checks for the sub-
scription existence. The idea is that in publish-subscribe systems,
different receiving permissions are modeled through the allowance
to different publish-subscribe topics, but not restricted inside the
same topic.
3.1.3 Comparison of LeBAC to other Models. The main difference
between LeBAC and LBAC is that LeBAC uses a total order instead
of a partial order on levels and has no concept of information flow
control. However, the LeBAC system policies include rules which
can be considered permission flow control, which LeBAC can support
due to being its own administrativemodel. Missing information flow
control, however, means that confidentiality cannot be provided if
any subject that was made part of the topic is malicious and decides
to copy the information and make it available by external means.
Comparison of LeBAC to other access control models yields an
impression on its capabilities and limits. Sandhu already showed
that RBAC can be used to realise a LBAC model and thus also
LeBAC. Yet, the single hierarchy of LeBAC prevents the realization
of permission assignments that are not in a total order, i.e. the
permission of two subjects are either identical or a strict subset
/ superset of one another, as subjects higher in the permission
hierarchy always have all permissions of any subject lower in the
hierarchy. This means that LeBAC is less expressive than LBAC and
RBAC. However, the requirement of totality of the “more powerful
than” relation is a key point for theMatrix idea of implementing
Conflict Resolution, which we will cover in Subsection 3.2, and
could not be implemented easily using the partial order permission
hierarchies employed by LBAC and RBAC.
3.1.4 Level- and Attribute-based Access Control. To overcome the
limited flexibility of LeBAC, the LeBAC policy decision can be
augmented with principles from Attribute-based Access Control
(ABAC) [12]. Policies are defined by the implementation, using the
policy decision of LeBAC, level and permissions attributes, and
other attributes of topics and subscriptions.
Level- and Attribute-based Access Control (LeABAC) allows
extending the set of attributes used for policy decision as well as to
restrict attribute values and value transitions: For example, Matrix
extends topic subscriptions to explicitly model the subscription
state as a status enumeration restricted to values “subscribed”,
“unsubscribed”, “invited” and “banned”. This subscription state can
be used for policies, e.g. only allow subjects in the “subscribed”
state to receive transactions instead of using the existence of a level
assignment like in LeBAC. In addition, the transition between states
can be restricted, e.g. to disallow the subject of a subscription in
the “banned” state from entering the “subscribed” state on their
discretion, even if the attribute is on their own subscription.
Also,Matrix extends topics with an attribute for a default level
assignment to subjects and categories of transactions. This e.g.
allows specifying that publishing attribute transactions requires a
level greater than the default subject level, except if the attribute is
on a subject’s own subscription. In addition, there are attributes to
specify whether a topic can be subscribed to by anyone or needs an
invitation, whether newly subscribed users can access topic history
from before their subscription existed, and many more.
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However, due to the Conflict Resolution layer being dependent
on the total order on subjects provided by LeBAC’s level assignment,
the additional attributes from LeABAC are for increased policy
expressiveness and do not fundamentally change the dealing with
partial order and non-finality.
3.2 Conflict Resolution
The core issue of access control on partially ordered transactions
is conflict resolution between concurrent, conflicting transactions.
Some form of conflict resolution has to be executed when a new
transaction has more than one other transaction in its “happened
before” relation, as it then merges two causally independent chains
which might contain conflicting transactions. The general idea of
conflict resolution is to use a partial order on transactions, and
extend that to a total order. The key idea is to use the total order on
levels from the access control system as specified in Subsection 3.1
to do this extension. The Conflict Resolution layer is comparable to
concurrency control algorithms in database systems [1], for which
approaches based on the significance of subjects exist as well [22].
However, a key difference is that, in database systems, concurrency
control is employed to schedule the application of transactions on
the database, i.e. at write time, while Conflict Resolution is used
to get a resolved state from transactions already committed to the
database, i.e. at read time.
As message transactions do not modify shared state, concurrent
messages can not conflict. However, concurrent attribute transac-
tions can, and conflicts caused by administrative attribute transac-
tions, which modify attributes relevant to the access control deci-
sion, are especially sensitive. The challenge is to design a conflict
resolution algorithm that combines several properties:
• deterministic: every execution on equal transaction sets
should give identical output
• secure: subjects should not be able to manipulate resolution
outcome to gain new or regain past permissions
• expectable: subjects expect that appending a new transac-
tions leads to a resolved state close to the recent state, even
if the transaction references old transactions
• efficient: every new transaction can trigger the execution
of the conflict resolution mechanism, and combine several
causally independent transaction chains
In Subsection 3.1, we used the Conflict Resolution layer to get
attributes of topics and subscriptions after the combined applica-
tion of all referenced “happened before” transactions by a new
transaction. In general, it is desirable for transactions to include
more than one “happened before” transaction, in order to reduce
the width of the DAG for efficiency reasons. To achieve determin-
ism, the function has to be a pure function that only depends on
the currently known transactions and their causal relation to each
other. For security, a major point is that malicious subjects cannot
evade the withdrawal of rights by other subjects with a higher ac-
cess level. For example, if an administrator publishes a transaction
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The full system policy definition of Matrix, which Matrix calls its “authorization
rules”, can be found at https://matrix.org/docs/spec/rooms/v1#id3.
that reduces the level of a subject, this subject could fork the DAG
before the reduction by publishing an arbitrary concurrent trans-
action that keeps their level intact, and then merge both causally
independent chains by a third transaction referencing both. State
resolution has to ensure that the withdrawal always ends up in the
resolved attribute set. In a more elaborate version of this attack, the
attacker can try to use their past access permissions by publishing
an attribute transaction for which their level is not sufficient any-
more in parallel to the withdrawal transaction, which then could
end up in the resolved attributes when both chains are merged. A
state resolution algorithm therefore has to treat causally indepen-
dent chains with an attribute and chains without an attribute as
possibly conflicting, and it has to ensure that the withdrawal is ex-
ecuted before the concurrent transaction. The general idea of how
to achieve this is to execute a deterministic topological sorting on
the partial order given by the causal relation to yield a linear order
in which parallel transactions are applied to the state from before
forking. This linear order is what then has to guarantee the above
properties. A description of the concurrency in a distributed system
with a causal “happened before” relation on events and generating
a linear order from it dates back to Lamport’s “Time, Clocks, and
the Ordering of Events in a Distributed System” [16]. Policy-related
events always have to be preferred in order to avoid withdrawal
evasion, but without violating the causal relation. An efficient state
resolution algorithm minimizes the number of transactions that
have to be accessed, and optimally works incrementally, i.e. the
result for new transactions can be computed from the result for old
transactions without having to take the full DAG into account.
3.2.1 The Matrix State Resolution Algorithm. The idea of the Ma-
trix state resolution algorithm [6, 13] is to split transactions into
non-conflicting and possibly conflicting sets, and execute the pos-
sibly conflicting transactions in two passes: In a first pass, sort
and apply transactions that could lead to a permission reduction,
and break ties by preferring transactions of subjects with a higher
level. In a second pass, sort and apply the remaining transactions.
This is based on the assumption that the subject with higher level
is not the attacker, as those subjects actually have the ability to
insert concurrent transactions to past transactions that shift state
resolution in their favor. We now explain the core ideas of how the
Matrix state resolution algorithm works7, simplified to focus on the
access control fundamentals. The algorithm combines the possibly
conflicting attribute sets of 𝑛 causally independent chains into a
single attribute set.
(1) For all 𝑛 causally independent chains: Reduce the chain to a
set of the most recent attribute transactions of each type.
(2) If a given type of attribute transaction has equal content in all
𝑛 sets, that attribute is considered non-conflicting. The trans-
actions are therefore removed and the attribute is added to
the resolved attribute state result set. All remaining attribute
transactions are considered to be potentially conflicting.
(3) From the remaining attribute transactions, separate all trans-
actions that can potentially withdraw access rights, as well
as all policy transactions relevant for the separated transac-
tion’s authorization which “happened before” them. Such
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authorization transactions are the level and permissions
transaction from LeBAC, but also include transactions rel-
evant for LeABAC extended policy decision making. The
creator transaction is relevant for authorization as well,
but as there can neither be a second creator transaction
nor a concurrent transaction, it cannot end up in the con-
flicting transactions.
(4) Sort the extracted transactions topologically using the partial
order given by their transitive happened before relation in
theDAG. To resolve ties in a deterministic and securemanner,
for two concurrent transactions, the smaller one is:
(a) The one whose sender has a higher level at the point of
those transactions
(b) The one with the earlier sender timestamp.
(c) The one with the lower hash value.
(5) Apply the linearized transactions to the attribute state result
set from the non-conflicting transactions. For each transac-
tion, check before application whether the access control
system would accept the transaction based on the current
state, as specified in Subsection 3.1. If this is not the case, the
transaction is ignored. This is why the relevant authorization
transactions are required: The authorizing transactions for
the withdrawal transaction has to be applied to the attribute
state before the withdrawal transaction.
(6) Take the remaining conflicting transactions and sort them
topologically by the partial order given by their transitive
happened before relation in the DAG. To resolve ties in a
deterministic and secure manner, for two concurrent trans-
actions, the smaller one is considered to be:
(a) The one with the earlier sender timestamp.
(b) The one with the lower hash value.
The idea is that because all permission withdrawals are
already applied, the tie-breaking step of checking for the
higher level can safely be omitted and instead applied in
an order which is closer to the actual temporal order.
(7) Apply the linearized transactions to the resolved attribute
state result set from the non-conflicting and withdrawal
transactions. For each transaction, check before application
whether the access control system would accept the transac-
tion based on the current state, as specified in Subsection 3.1.
If this is not the case, the transaction is ignored.
The algorithm extends transactions by a sender_timestamp
attribute which is set to the transaction publication time by honest
subjects. However, it can be set to arbitrary values by faulty subjects,
especially they can set their sender_timestamp to an arbitrarily
high value to always appear as the most recent transaction after
the resolution. In contrast to arbitrary, i.e. hash-based orderings,
timestamps have a meaning for users and can be easily recognized
as forged or improbable. Honest subjects with a higher power level
can then still enforce permission removal on the faulty subject, as
their transactions administrative actions are favored in step (4).
As soon as a honest subject then sends a new transaction that
references the faulty one as “happened before”, the advantage is
gone as causal ordering is used before sender_timestamp.
3.2.2 Soft Failure. A general problem for all conflict resolution
algorithms is that, due to the non-finality of the “happened before”
DAG, attackers can always append transactions to arbitrary exist-
ing transactions, including “old” ones, and exercise the permissions
they had at that point in time. As transactions that purposefully
reference old transactions cannot be distinguished from actually
old transactions that just have not been successfully synchronized,
those transactions have to be treated as valid, due to the lack of
some form of consensus on a point in the DAG after which all
transactions are seen as final. For attribute transactions, the state
resolution algorithm as described above will handle this, because,
as soon as a new transaction unifies both chains, state resolution
will prioritize the possible withdrawal of rights and authorize that
parallel transaction afterwards. However, message transactions
are always accepted and end up in the topic’s message history if
they were valid at that point in time. To prevent this attacker be-
havior, Matrix uses the concept of “soft failure” as a third state
between accepted and rejected transactions: If a newly received
transaction does pass the authorization checks as described in Sub-
section 3.1, but would not pass the authorization checks based on
the hypothetical current attribute state of the topic, i.e. assuming
that the transaction would attach to all current leaf transactions,
it is assumed to be a malicious event and soft-failed. A soft-failed
transaction will be appended at its place, but will neither be re-
layed to clients nor be used in the “happened before” relation of
new transactions. Nevertheless, the transaction takes part in state
resolution as normal. The idea is that accepting but not delivering
the malicious messages disincentivizes sending such transactions.
3.2.3 Optimization: Proof of Permission. The actualMatrix state
resolution algorithm includes an important optimization [13]: Each
and every transaction has a reference to all policy and permission
transactions that are required to authorize the transaction, i.e. a
“proof of permission”. State resolution is executed using the par-
tial ordering given by the “Authorization DAG” that emerges from
recursively taking in all relevant policy and permission transac-
tions, instead of the DAG that emerges from the causal relation
of all transactions. This reduces the need to keep every transac-
tion as long as a topic exists to those transactions contained only
in the “Authorization DAG” as well as the most recent attribute
transactions. This also enables a transaction retention time not
only dictated by disk space or other resources, but actually as a
subject-defined topic policy. However, this optimization has the
potential for new security issues that are not apparent in the base
idea. For example, there are circumstances where non-conflicting
transactions can be overwritten by mistake due to not using the
full “happened before” relation. The optimization therefore needs
an additional last step where all non-conflicting transactions are
applied to the result again.
4 DECENTRALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT
The explained access control model and conflict resolution is inde-
pendent of whether it is implemented as a centralized, distributed,
or decentralized system. Both, a distributed and a decentralized
implementation, have to distribute the Reference Monitor and the
Transaction Store layer to multiple nodes. We now focus on a de-





































Figure 5: Layer model for a decentralized TDAG and Reference
Monitor. Rounded, blue-filled boxes are layers, rectangles are inter-
faces provided by the lower layer and used by the upper layer. In
contrast to Fig. 1, this shows entities and not only functionality.
4.1 Decentralized Access Control with
Eventual Consistency
Figure 5 shows the decentralized implementation of Matrix. The
Transaction Store can be implemented by a Transaction-based Di-
rected Acyclic Graph (TDAG) in a decentralized manner where
servers maintain a local replica of the TDAG for their clients. Each
topic has its own, independent TDAG representing its full history.
This means that only servers with users subscribed to a topic take
part in a given TDAG, and therefore the concepts inherently pro-
vides sharding. We say a server is subscribed to a topic when at
least one user of the server subscribed to the topic. Each server sub-
scribed to a topic maintains a local copy of all transactions related
to the topic, i.e. a replica of the topic’s TDAG.
A new transaction to be published and given to a server is
checked for validity and authorization by the local Reference Mon-
itor and then appended to the server’s local replica. The “happened
before” transactions of this new transaction are determined by the
server, always using transactions without descendants known to
the server. In terms of the causal order given by the DAG as shown
in Fig. 2, transactions without descendants are the set of causally lat-
est transactions.Matrix limits the number of referenced “happened
before” transactions to reduce the effort required for conflict reso-
lution. Concretely, from the set of all transactions without known
descendants, servers choose the five known transactions with the
longest distance to the unique, causally earliest transaction in the
DAG, i.e. the creator transaction, and five random transactions
with a shorter distance to the earliest transaction. This strategy
is intended to ensure that all causally independent chains even-
tually converge during a phase without concurrent transactions.
Afterwards, the transaction is broadcasted to all other subscribed
servers. As shown in Fig. 5, subscribed servers will enforce that new
transactions from other servers pass the local Reference Monitor
based on the current policy information in their TDAG replica. If
the authorization checks are passed, the servers append the new
transaction to their local replica. If a transaction is ‘dropped’ on a
link between two servers, e.g. due to network partitions, the DAGs
will get out of sync, i.e. get in an inconsistent state. All servers will
still always accept local transactions if they pass their authorization
checks done by their Reference Monitor. In the underlying DAG,
as shown in Fig. 2, appending concurrent transactions leads to a
fork in the DAG and two causally independent chains. As soon as
the partition is recovered and the servers receive a new transaction
whose “happened before” transactions are missing in their replica,
the server will query other servers for the missing transactions
round-robin. The receiving server can verify that the transaction
is correct by computing its hash. This process is called backfilling
in Matrix. Backfilling is executed recursively, walking down the
“happened before” relation until the server encounters a known
transaction. Through backfilling and the append-only nature of the
TDAG, eventual consistency is achieved. After eventual consistency
is achieved, new transactions will reference both causal chains in
their “happened before” relation, which will merge the chains again,
while potential conflicts in attributes between the two chains are
handled by Conflict Resolution.
As shown in Fig. 5, each server independently operates a Conflict
Resolution layer on its TDAG replica to compute current attributes
values, as well as a ReferenceMonitor layer to enforce authorization
policies. As stated in Subsection 3.2, the conflict resolution algo-
rithm is required to be deterministic and to only have the TDAG as
input. To achieve equivalence of the distributed Reference Monitor
and Conflict Resolution with the trusted third party model from
Section 3, the implementations executed by the replicas have to be
equivalent with each other. We say that two implementations are
equivalent if they derive identical attributes and access decisions
based on equivalent sets of transactions. This means that employed
algorithms can e.g. differ in complexity, as long as their output
remains the same. While each server executes Conflict Resolution
and Reference Monitor independently, with equivalent, determinis-
tic algorithms and an eventually consistent Transaction Store, all
honest, non-faulty servers will eventually reach agreement with
each other on whether a given transaction should be accepted. Thus,
the Reference Monitor that was provided by the trusted third party
in the conceptual model is distributed and placed on all subscribed
servers, which interrupt incoming as well as outgoing transactions
as seen in Fig. 5, make an independent access control decision based
on its current state, and enforce the decision regardless of the deci-
sions of other servers. Servers do not vote or announce some form
of consensus, there is no quorum, and majority does not win.
In addition, decentralized implementations can introduce specific
attributes that are relevant for access control, e.g.Matrix allows for
a “server access control list” attribute which bans certain servers
and subsequently all of their users from participation in a topic.
4.2 Assessment of TDAG-based Decentralized
Access Control
Let us now come back to the guiding question given in the Introduc-
tion and analyze whether the requirements stated in Subsection 2.3
are fulfilled. In summary, the access control of Matrix or of a similar
TDAG-based system are based on the following assumptions:
(1) Out of two subjects, the one with the higher level is the
‘honest’ one.
(2) Authorization policies and conflict resolution are determin-
istic and equivalently implemented by all ‘honest’ subjects.
(3) Whatever an attacker is doing: authorization policies and
conflict resolution
• do not allow unauthorized transactions
• do not allow unauthorized privilege escalation
• always prefer the ‘honest’ subject.
While the first assumption is simply an axiomatic one ("by de-
sign"), the second and third assumptions are not easily guaranteed.
We proceed as follows: first, the attacker model is clarified and some
existing countermeasures against some attacks are listed. Based
on the first step, we argue in an ‘evidence-based’ way that guar-
anteeing assumptions (2) and (3) requires more than the existing
countermeasures by showing a class of attacks on each assumption.
In particular, we derive the need for a formal verification of the
conflict resolution mechanism and authorization policies.
4.2.1 Attacker model and existing countermeasures. It is sufficient
to look at the possibilities of an attacker subscribed to a single
topic, as each topic is strictly independent from any other topic
and the subscribed servers form an independent federation without
any non-subscribed servers. The assessment focuses on attackers
that participate in the system, assuming that means like mutual
authentication and encryption prevent man in the middle attacks.
The TDAG approach works in the following attacker models:
honest users are on honest servers, byzantine users are on byzantine
servers they fully control, and byzantine users are on honest servers
they don’t control. As a homeserver acts as representative for its
users and is their only source of information on the current state
of topics, a user’s homeserver is in the position of a Dolev-Yao
attacker and is also in full control of the reference monitor for their
users. This trust model is comparable to e-mail with the difference
that the Matrix protocol mandates transport layer authentication,
integrity checks, and encryption between servers.
To cope with message forging or tampering by byzantine servers,
each server has a public/private key pair that is used to sign trans-
actions published by its users. Subscribed servers can validate the
signature and verify whether the transaction was sent by the origin
server and is unmodified. To provide some end-to-end guaran-
tees even with malicious servers, authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation could be provided by public/private key pairs for each
user, signing both message and attribute transactions, but only en-
crypting transactions which are not needed for server-side policy
enforcement. Keys can be verified by a Public Key Infrastructure
or out-of-band / in-person validation. Alternatively, depending on
the concrete goals, ratcheting-based end-to-end encryption proto-
cols can provide repudiation.Matrix currently only supports the
repudiable end-to-end encryption through their own cryptographic
ratchet protocols, which are based on the Signal protocol, and in-
person validation. If both repudiable and non-repudiable end-to-end
encryption were supported by Matrix, a topic attribute could spec-
ify the concrete per-topic end-to-end security mechanism. Also,
Matrix currently does not encrypt Attribute Transactions en-to-
end, which would be possible for all attributes that are not relevant
for policy decision. While providing end-to-end guarantees are one
way of reducing the impact of a malicious server that has honest
users, i.e. reducing the trust required in a user’s server, the refer-
ence monitor is still controlled by a malicious party, and metadata
is not protected. TheMatrix project tries to solve those issues by
making it possible for users to be multihomed, i.e. a user’s account
can be associated with multiple servers, which easily allows them
to move away from a server in which they lost trust. In addition,
the goal is making server implementations and transaction distribu-
tion efficient enough so that they can be run directly on the user’s
devices [9], makingMatrix a hybrid of a federated and peer-to-peer
protocol. Multihomed users will pose an interesting new challenge
for the access control system, as a server then has to prove that it
currently is allowed to represent a given user, which requires some
kind of access rights delegation from users to servers. Peer-to-peer
servers also need to remove the dependency on the Domain Name
System for inter-server authentication. This also improves security:
An attacker which gains control over a server’s domain name can-
not impersonate the server anymore and e.g. access and backfill
transactions in all topics that impersonated server has access to.
In byzantine fault tolerant consensus systems or distributed
ledger technologies, byzantine fault resilience is usually expressed
as the share of the full network controlled by attackers that con-
sensus finding can tolerate. For the decentralized access control
system described in Subsection 4.1, this logic is not applicable, since,
through the causal order on transactions and the decentralized ac-
cess control decision and enforcement, the system does not have to
solve a consensus problem. Regardless of the number of attackers,
each and every user has their own reference monitor in form of
their homeserver which enforces access control on incoming and
outgoing transactions. As every reference monitor makes its access
decision independently, i.e. does not care about the access decision
of the majority of subscribed servers, attackers cannot influence the
decision through their numbers of participating servers. As long as
an attacker cannot interrupt the connection between two honest
servers, those will reach a consistent DAG state, enforce the same
access control, and provide availability for their users, even if all
other servers subscribed to a topic are malicious.
4.2.2 Attack surface and found issues. The (evident) first class of
attacks is enabled by incorrectly specified policy rules that give
someone ‘unintended’ access rights and, thus, allow for privilege
escalation or the capability of deleting a user’s access rights. While
this class of attacks is, of course, not specific toMatrix or TDAG-
based approaches, we encountered this type of policy misspecifica-
tion in the Matrix specification (see below). This class of attacks
targets assumption (3). The (less evident) second class of attacks is
enabled by deviations in how servers deal with conflict resolution,
which targets assumption (2). Both classes of attacks result in the
universal or partial acceptance of a malicious transaction. Thereby,
an attacker could, for example, unsolicitedly subscribe to a topic
breaking confidentiality, elevate access rights to a higher level, or
even break the eventual consistency by having different servers
make different policy decisions. While the first class is present in
the trusted third party conceptual model as well, the second class
only exists in the decentralized implementation due to differing
behavior in the decentralized Reference Monitor implementation.
When analyzing the Matrix specification and implementations,
we found the following vulnerabilities which mainly belong to the
second class of issues, i.e. subtle differences between specification
and implementations due to inconsistencies or omissions on ei-
ther side. Concretely, this class describes the issue of two groups
of servers making different decisions on which transactions to in-
clude in the DAG. For this, two server implementations that deviate
in behavior as well as an attacker are needed to be subscribed
on the same topic. Depending on the inconsistency, the attacker
needs to control not only their client but also their server, and have
sufficient access rights to cause the inconsistent behavior. If one
implementation accepts the attacker’s transaction and the other im-
plementation rejects it, the attacker forced an inconsistency of the
DAG between the implementations that cannot be resolved, break-
ing eventual consistency. If the attacker transaction is relevant for
access control, this will lead to a deviation in the policy information
and therefore to the Reference Monitors making different access
control decisions. But even if not for the policy information, broken
eventual consistency leads to two independent views of a topic,
which cannot be combined again and can render the topic unusable
for its purpose and requires to switch to a new one without the
malicious transaction. This situation is reminiscent of a “hard fork”
in blockchain distributed ledger technologies.
The found issues were as follows:
a) The wire format of integers in the specification restricts their
value to the range [−253 + 1, 253 − 1]. This restriction was not
enforced by synapse
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, the reference Matrix server, and effectively
limited to the range of 64 bit signed integers. This allows for a class
two attack.While this attack can be executed on any integer present
in the wire format like the sender timestamp, it can especially be
used by the attacker to send a level attribute transaction with a
value beyond the range allowed in the specification but still accepted
by synapse, leading to an inconsistent policy database between
synapse and a specification-compliant homeserver. This is planned
to be corrected in room specification v7.
b) For the permission to publish a message transaction with a
highlighting notification, the authorization policies did not follow
the general rule of denying to set the required level higher than the
policy sender’s current level. This is a class one attack that allows
to remove the permission to send notifications from other users
with the same level. Synapse did implement the check anyway and
rejected such transactions, but a specification-compliant implemen-
tation would have had to accept it, leading to a possible class two
attack. This will be corrected in room specification
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c) The specification does not limit the number of transaction
linked as “happened before” and does not specify a transaction
selection algorithm other than taking all known leaf transactions,
but Synapse does reject transactions with more than 20 parent
transactions. This can be abused by an attacker by sending enough
concurrent transactions to always make sure there are more than 20
leaf transactions in the DAG. The specification-compliant servers
will list all of them as “happened before”, which will lead synapse
to reject the transaction. In a variation of mechanism from the
other class two attacks, this does not send an in-itself malicious
transaction, but seemingly honest transactions lead to a denial of





implementations and synapse. As an effect of the denial of service on
the channel, this breaks eventual consistency and therefore is a class
two attack. This is planned to be corrected in room specification
v7, and will be retroactively enforced in older versions.
d) Server access control lists allow publishing subjects to ban a
server including all of its users from a topic. However, no equivalent
of the rule of not being able to withdraw access rights from subjects
with a higher level was demanded, which allows the attacker to
ban users with a higher level. This an error in the authorization
policy and therefore a class one attack. While synapse accurately
implemented this inconsistency in the specification, alternative
implementations could deviate from the specification replace it with
a secure version, e.g. enforcing a check that none of the users on
the banned server have a higher level than the banning user, which
would then lead to an additional class two attack. A mitigation in
synapse was introduced
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which restricts the modification of server
access control lists to administrators by default.
All issues were responsibly disclosed to theMatrix core team.
4.2.3 Gained insights. The security of Matrix faces two funda-
mental threats: Incorrect specification, i.e. authorization errors also
present in the trusted third party model, and non-equivalence, i.e.
divergence of decentralized implementations that leads to diver-
gence from the trusted third party model. All security issues from
Subsection 4.2 were implications from those threats. One impor-
tant way to mitigate both threats and, thereby, to prevent all found
issues, is the formalization of the authorization policies and conflict
resolution algorithm. Using the formalization to prove security and
correctness properties helps to prevent the first threat. We identi-
fied the following security properties as crucial to be satisfied by
any set of authorization policies and conflict resolution mechanism
to be secure:
• The algorithms have to be deterministic and only depend
on data present in the DAG, to create a decentralized refer-
ence monitor that makes the same policy decision at each
consistent replica.
• Users are unable to gain permissions out of nowhere, but
have to receive those permissions from someone who has
the permission to provide others with them.
• If two transactions are conflicting, the one with the higher
level has to be preferred
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.
• A permission withdrawal always has to be preferred to a
concurrent permission usage with lower level.
While the set currently employed by Matrix is engineered to fulfill
those properties in most cases, any action for which they are not
satisfied is a potential security vulnerability.
To protect against the second threat, the formalization can be
used to generate code in any language the implementations require,
providing them with equivalent implementations of authorization
policy checks and conflict resolution. In addition, in face of new and
improved algorithms, the formalization can be used to prove equiv-
alence and therefore compatibility with the current ones without




In case of same level, a deterministic tie break is required.
The security assessment shows that a valid decentralized access
control system can potentially be built on top of the weak guar-
antees of causal order, eventual consistency and no finality, but
requires that the distributed reference monitor instances make the
same policy decisions when presented with the same data. Here,
some form of logical centrality comes into play. The use of Matrix
and its access control approach as an open, decentralized system in
"mission-critical" environments should, thus, require formal verifi-
cation of authorization policies as well as of conflict resolution.
5 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
We positioned and generalized the concepts used by the Matrix
federated publish-subscribe middleware with respect to both access
control models and distributed ledger technologies. We have shown
that a causal-order TDAG-based distributed ledger without finality
can indeed be sufficient for the decentralized implementation of a
conceptual model for access control systems based on Lattice- and
Attribute-based Access Control. We described and categorized the
model, and explicitly stated its assumptions and required interface.
To the best of our knowledge,Matrix is the only system that imple-
ments access control based on an eventually consistent partial order
without finality and without a consensus algorithm. While this re-
sults in a valid access control system, the system behaves differently
than traditional, consensus-based access control systems:Matrix
allows for “pluralism of opinions” on the current state of the system
and provides access control mechanisms that cope with that fact
instead of following the majority or an assigned leader. Therefore, a
good understanding of the resulting consequences is recommended
with regard to deployments in sensitive environments.
Our security analysis found no inherent flaws in the decentral-
ized implementation of the reference monitor and policy informa-
tion data structure, but showed possible points of attack on concrete
implementations. The found issues were disclosed responsibly. In
our security assessment, we stressed the importance of specifying
the conflict resolution algorithm as the core security mechanism
in a formal calculus. First, this allows code generation from the
calculus as a single source of truth, thus avoiding implementation
differences. Second, this allows a formal proof of the security of the
authorization policies and conflict resolution as crucial parts of the
decentralized access control system.
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